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ABSTRACT
The research described in this paper concerns automatic cyberbul-
lying detection in social media. There are two goals to achieve:
building a gold standard cyberbullying detection dataset and mea-
suring the performance of the Samurai cyberbullying detection
system. The Formspring dataset provided in a Kaggle competition
was re-annotated as a part of the research. The annotation pro-
cedure is described in detail and, unlike many other recent data
annotation initiatives, does not use Mechanical Turk for finding
people willing to perform the annotation. The new annotation com-
pared to the old one seems to be more coherent since all tested
cyberbullying detection system performed better on the former.
The performance of the Samurai system is compared with 5 com-
mercial systems and one well-known machine learning algorithm,
used for classifying textual content, namely Fasttext. It turns out
that Samurai scores the best in all measures (accuracy, precision
and recall), while Fasttext is the second-best performing algorithm.
Michał Ptaszyński, Gniewosz Leliwa,Mateusz Piech, andAleksander Smywiń-
ski-Pohl. Cyberbullying Detection – Technical Report 2/2018 Department
of Computer Science AGH University of Science and Technology.
1 INTRODUCTION
Cyberbullying is a phenomenon observed in many Internet ser-
vices, where people, especially young users, share their thoughts
regarding their personal interests, life and problems. Some of the
users use methods such as harassment, threat, intimidation and
mocking in order to make others feel worse, to undermine their
self-esteem and to discourage them from posting questions, mes-
sages or personal images. Anonymity is one of the factors which
makes this activity particularly attractive to bullies since they do
not face social ostracism or other negative consequences connected
with improper behavior. The problem has been growing since the
outset of social networks. The most striking episode occurred when
the Formspring social network was closed, probably due to the
suicides connected with the messages containing cyberbullying,
This copy of the paper excludes Appendices, containing abusive words. For a copy of
the paper including Appendices as well as a copy of the re-annotated dataset please
send a request to apohllo@agh.edu.pl. Both of theses items may not be distributed
electronically without a written consent from the authors of this paper.
exchanged via that website. It is believed that the feature of the
service allowing people who know each other outside the Internet
to message themselves anonymously played an important role.
As such cyberbullying is a very important problem, which has its
roots in technology. But technology can also help to reduce or even
eradicate it. Development of Natural Language Processing (NLP)
algorithms aimed at the detection of cyberbullying is one of the
ways to achieve that goal. Such algorithms require annotated data
at least to measure their performance. Moreover, the most popular
Machine Learning (ML) algorithms, Deep Neural Networks (DNN)
in particular, require large annotated corpora in order to obtain
high quality classification results. Unfortunately, there are only a
few publicly available dataset for cyberbullying detection:
• Kaggle Formspring data for Cyberbullying Detection1
• MySpace Group Data Labeled for Cyberbullying2
The Kaggle Formspring dataset was originally annotated using
the Mechanical Turk service. The methodology behind the annota-
tion process was pretty simplistic [1]. Namely, a post was marked as
containing cyberbullying if two of the annotators indicated that it
contains that phenomenon. Moreover, the annotators did not have
any training towards the detection of cyberbullying. As a result,
the annotation has a moderate quality (which we discuss in Section
2.1). Since the dataset and its annotation are crucial for the task, we
have decided to use the same dataset, but provide a new annotation,
obtained by a well designed process. The new annotation is the
primary outcome of our research.
We also want to assess the performance of one of the systems
for cyberbullying detection – namely the Samurai developed by
Samurai Labs (a new brand of Fido Voice). The Samurai’s authors
point out few key features of their system that differentiates it from
the other state-of-the-art approaches:
• The underlying philosophy of dividing the big problem of
detecting online violence into a number of smaller problems
related to certain online violence phenomena, allowing quick
adjustment of the system to the clients’ needs, based on
general guidelines how the system should react on certain
types of phenomena (“onboarding process”).
1https://www.kaggle.com/swetaagrawal/formspring-data-for-cyberbullying-detection
2http://www.chatcoder.com/Data/BayzickBullyingData.rar
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• The technological ability to enhance the learning capabilities
of DNN with a symbolic governance relying on the grammar
structure and experts’ knowledge, making it much more
independent from labeled datasets and allowing to overcome
many other deep learning’s limitations [2].
• The immunity for adversarial attacks [3].
Disclaimer: Samurai Labs has sponsored the annotation initiative.
The creators of Samurai did not have access to the new annotation,
until the final testing of the system was performed. In order to keep
the highest scientific standards of independence and objectivity,
the process was mediated by the Department of Computer Science
of AGH University of Science and Technology, who performed the
final testing of all systems and algorithms versus the old and the
new annotation.
2 DATASET
Formspring data for Cyberbullying Detection (a large unlabeled
Formspring dataset, from a Summer 2010 crawl [1]), available on
Kaggle and prepared by Kelly Reynolds was chosen as a test dataset.
The main reasons for choosing this dataset were:
• Its comparatively large size: 12772 data samples.
• The fact that it is fairly well-known dataset with an initial
release in October, 2016, and the last update in January, 2017.
• The fact that the number of sentences with bully contents
reflects the real-world proportions of cyberbullying and no-
cyberbullying content (more than 84% of samples were la-
beled as “no cyberbullying”).
• The option of anonymity that encourages cyberbullying and
other harmful behaviors (Formspring allowed users to post
questions anonymously to any other user’s page).
• The controversies around Formspring related to harassment
and cyberbullying that eventually led to the death of few
teenagers in 2011 and shutdown of the service in 2013 3.
Detailed statistics of the dataset are presented in Section 2.6.
2.1 Limitations of the Present Annotation
A preliminary analysis of the annotation quality demonstrates nu-
merous shortcomings that put in question its usage in a testing
process. Each sample was labeled by three Amazon’s Mechanical
Turk workers with “yes” and “no” answers for a question if it con-
tains cyberbullying. The cyberbullying was also tagged for severity
from 0 (no bullying) to 10. A post was considered harmful if at
least two out of three annotators answered “yes” for the primary
question. As a result 802 samples out of 12772 (6.3%) were classified
as “cyberbullying”.
In the description of the annotation process there was no infor-
mation about annotators’ competence and there were too many
missed cases of cyberbullying as well as many cases of non-bullying
content that were incorrectly labeled as cyberbullying.
An analysis of the annotated samples showed that at least 2.5%
of posts classified as “no cyberbullying” should be labeled as “cyber-
bullying” due to their possible harmful impact. This is a noticeable
3https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spring.me
Table 1: The number of correctly annotated samples (out of
30) for the people that performed the annotation.
ID Correct Labels Percentage
#01 24 80.0%
#02 24 80.0%
#03 23 76.7%
#04 22 73.3%
#05 22 73.3%
#06 21 70.0%
#07 21 70.0%
#08 20 66.7%
amount compared to the percentage of the samples labeled as “cy-
berbullying”. Few striking examples of the missed cases are given
in Appendix B.
Similarly, about 15-20% of the samples labeled as “cyberbullying”
could be labeled as “no cyberbullying” due to an infinitesimal harm-
fulness or even obvious annotators’ errors. Few examples of the
cases incorrectly labeled as “cyberbullying” are given in Appendix
B.
Therefore, we decided to re-annotate the whole Formspring
dataset. The annotators’ recruitment process and the actual re-
annotation process are described in details in the following section.
The annotation instructions that the annotators were provided with
is available in Appendix A.
2.2 Annotators
The task of Cyberbullying Detection (CB-D) is specific in the sense
that it requires highly trained data annotators with sufficient back-
ground for high quality annotations. Differently to well known
tasks, such as traditional sentiment analysis, annotators employed
in CB-D should either be experienced in Internet Patrol activi-
ties (patrolling the Internet in the search for harmful contents),
or should have a sufficient specialist knowledge in psychology,
psychiatry, or related fields.
We made an open call for data annotators within graduate stu-
dents of psychology, with a condition of at least near-native English
proficiency (language of initial data samples). In specific situations
we also allowed undergraduates, but only with very high achieve-
ments.
Sixteen (16) initial candidates responded to our call. The candi-
dates were given an initial test to eliminate possible outliers and
low performance annotators. In the initial test the candidates were
given 30 random samples to annotate with already prepared gold
standard answers. The top eight candidates were retained, while
the low performance half was rejected. Their scores for the initial
test are given in Table 1.
2.2.1 I stage of annotation. Each annotator annotated a large
number of samples. The whole annotation process started on May
25th, 2018 and ended on June 30th, 2018, and was divided into 2
stages. At the first stage, annotators were provided with smaller
portions of the total 12772 samples and each time a deadline for
annotation of the given portions was set (usually 6-7 days for la-
beling a portion of 2400 samples). The average time for annotating
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Table 2: The assignment of samples to individual annotators
in the first stage of annotation.
Portion 1st Annot. 2nd Annot. 3rd Annot.
1-2400 #08 #01 #04
2401-4800 #04 #03 #01
4801-7200 #01 #04 #08
7201-9600 #03 #08 #02
9601-11185 #06 #05 #03
11186-12772 #07 #02 #06
Table 3: The assignment of samples to individual annotators
in the second stage of annotation.
Portion 1st Annot. 2nd Annot. 3rd Annot.
119 from 1-2400 #03 #02 #07
487 from 2401-4800 #08 #02 #07
127 from 4801-7200 #03 #02 #07
209 from 7201-9600 #04 #01 #07
289 from 9601-11185 #04 #01 #08
221 from 11186-12772 #04 #01 #03
a single sample was 30 seconds. Annotators were allowed to an-
notate the given portion in elastic work time, according to their
preferences and availability. After each portion, annotators were
asked if they were willing to continue the labeling process with
the next portion. They proceeded only after the agreement. No one
resigned during the annotation process. The assignments of the
parts to the annotators in the first stage are given in Table 2.
After the first stage of annotations there were 11320 samples
(88.63% of all data) annotated unequivocally by all three annotators
handling each sample. Within this data there were 11007 (86.18%)
samples annotated as non-cyberbullying / non-harmful, 285 (2.23%)
annotated as cyberbullying / harmful, and 28 samples annotated as
uncertain / I don’t know. The 28 samples which all three annotators
were not able to annotate were forwarded to a cyberbullying expert
for final decision. Except the unequivocal samples, there were 1452
samples (11.37%) annotated with some level of disagreement. This
ambiguous data was used in the second stage of the annotation.
2.2.2 II stage of annotation. Before the second stage, the pre-
liminary data analysis was performed. At this stage, all of the 1452
ambiguous samples were distributed between 6 annotators. The
parts contained from 467 to 942 samples that corresponded to the
primary division of the data set (e.g. 119 ambiguous samples in the
first portion of 1-2400 samples). A deadline for this stage was set
to 4 days. The assignments of the parts to the annotators in the
second stage are given in Table 3.
In the whole annotation process (both stages), Annotator #01 to
Annotator #08 annotated in total: 7919, 4720, 6852, 7919, 1585, 3172,
2529, 7976 samples, respectively. This is 42672 samples in total and
5334 samples on average per annotator.
2.3 Annotation Guidelines
Each annotator was provided with a PDF file with the annotation
instruction at the beginning of the recruitment process. The exact
instruction as it was delivered to the annotators is presented in the
Appendix A.
The main task of an annotator was to label each sample with
one of three possible labels:
0 – text certainly does not contain online violence;
1 – text certainly contains online violence;
2 – uncertain case.
In both stages, the annotators were encouraged to use “2” when-
ever they have doubts if a sample contains a cyberbullying or not.
Splitting the whole annotation process into two stages was consid-
ered since the beginning. The goal of the first stage was to split the
dataset into equivocal and unequivocal samples. Then, the equivo-
cal samples were annotated by additional 3 annotators that have
never seen the samples before. Based on these two stages, the fi-
nal labels were determined using all annotations and weighting
schemes described in the next section.
The labeling criteria were defined by describing online violence
phenomena in relation to the target of the violence. Therefore, the
main concerns were:
• Which types of phenomena can be considered as cyberbul-
lying (e.g. personal attacks, threats, blackmails)?
• Who must be the target of online violence behavior in order
to consider the sample as cyberbullying (e.g. interlocutor,
individuals or groups identified by names)?
As the task is to detect cyberbullying, not profanity or abusive
language in general, the guidelines recommended to turn a blind
eye to any usage of bad language in other situations than abusing
or offending other person or things that are (or might be) important
to this person.
2.4 Inter-annotator Agreements and Weighting
Scheme
Firstly, we looked at each particular annotator, to specify the order
of their proficiency in data labelling. This would allow us later
to properly weight the annotators in case of unclear annotation
results, and thus disambiguate the cases for which the final decision
whether a sample (sentence, Internet entry) was harmful or not
couldn’t be easily made.
After the annotation process was complete, we calculated how
the annotaters agreed between one another. As a mean for ranking
the annotators and verifying inter-annotator agreement we decided
to use a simple percentage of the same agreements within all appli-
cable annotations, which was calculated for each pair of annotators.
The overall annotator ranking score was calculated as an average
of all agreements with additional information provided by standard
deviation.
The reason for not using standard kappa [4] for calculating inter-
annotator agreement was as follows. Typical kappa is calculated
for two classes, while in our class we allowed the third class ("un-
certain” / “I don’t know"). Moreover, kappa assumes that there is
an ideal answer (such as a type of disease to detect), whereas for cy-
berbullying the case is more complicated. Although there are strict
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Table 4: Agreements between annotators in the first stage of
annotation.
ID Mean agreement Standard deviation
#08 95.4% 1.4%
#02 92.2% 3.1%
#07 91.6% 4.9%
#01 91.6% 5.4%
#04 91.4% 5.2%
#03 88.9% 4.3%
#06 88.1% 0.8%
#05 87.5% 2.4%
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Figure 1: Agreements between annotators in the first stage
of annotation.
rules which define that something is potentially a cyberbullying
Internet entry, the ultimate decision whether something is or is not
a cyberbullying is how the bullied person feels about it. Therefore,
unless a first-person perspective evaluation is possible (which is
difficult if not impossible to obtain in practice), the decision has to
be made based on the expert knowledge of the annotators, with the
initial assumption that all of them are equally capable to perform
the task.
There was no correlation (based on Pearson Rank Correlation
coefficient) between annotator score and initial test results. The
Table 4 and Figure 1 give the mean agreements (with standard
deviation) for each annotator.
The average of all overall agreement scores among the annota-
tors was 90.86%. Three of the annotators were below the average,
and we considered them as the “low performance group”. However,
since the data was annotated each time by three different annota-
tors, we did not assume a top down threshold for weighting the
annotators, but verified the weighted rank for each sample based
on each annotator’s average strength of agreement.
2.5 Data Annotation Results
2.5.1 I Stage of Annotation. After the analysis of annotator per-
formance, we looked at the data from the point of view of the
Table 5: The outline of the dataset after the first stage of an-
notation.
Type Number Percentagen
non-harmful 11007 86.18%
harmful 285 2.23%
I don’t know 28 0.22%
equivocal 1452 11.37%
sum 12772 100.00%
annotated samples. Therefore, we focused on agreements calcu-
lated per sample, and not per annotator. Most of the samples (almost
90%) were annotated unequivocally, which was a positive result
suggesting good quality of the dataset and supporting the good per-
formance of annotators. Grand majority (86%) of annotations was
considered as not harmful. Only about 2% was considered harmful
without a doubt by all annotators in the first stage of annotations.
There was also a small number (28) of samples for which none of
the annotators had any idea how to classify them (uncertain / I don’t
know), and also a small number of samples (17) which were not
annotated, probably by accident. The 28 samples which all three
annotators were not able to annotate as well as the missing annota-
tions were forwarded to a cyberbullying expert for final decision.
The remaining 1452 samples (11.37%) annotated equivocally with
some level of disagreement were used in the second stage of anno-
tation. Table 5 contains the general outline of the dataset after the
first stage of annotations.
Since most of the samples were annotated unequivocally, in the
later stage of data preparation we focused only on those samples,
which were problematic (ambiguous, or annotated equivocally).
To eliminate, and further specify the equivocal annotations we
performed two types of analysis. Firstly, we performed the second
stage of annotations, as described in Section 2.4. However, relying
only on the new second stage annotations and not taking into
account also the first annotations whatsoever could introduce an
additional bias. It could also add evenmore ambiguity to the samples
which were only slightly ambiguous. Therefore, we also created an
analysis procedure to weight all ambiguous annotations depending
on how ambiguous they were. Finally, we compared both: weighted
first stage ambiguous annotations and second stage annotations
(also weighted for ambiguous cases). The analysis was done to
eliminate the ambiguity to some extent, or to somehow estimate
the annotation class value even if the annotation did not reveal a
clear cut. Finally, after the comparison of two annotation attempts,
all the annotations that were left, which could not be disambiguated,
were forwarded to the cyberbullying expert to obtain final verdict.
2.5.2 Disambiguation Procedure for Equivocal Samples. Since
each data sample was annotated by three annotators, we divided
the equivocal samples as follows.
(1) if one I don’t know case→ remaining two decide
(a) if remaining twowere unequivocal→OK (disambiguation
complete)
(b) if remaining twowere scrambled→ applying inter-annotator
agreement-based weighting scheme + expert check for fi-
nal decision
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Table 6: The outline of the ambiguous results and the disam-
biguation scheme for each type of ambiguity.
Type of Ambiguity No. of Cases Disambiguation
has “I don’t know” 1176
↪→ 1 IDK (all) 931 OK
↪→ 1 IDK unequivocal 762 weighting + expert
↪→ 1 IDK scrambled 169 expert
↪→ 2 IDK 245 weighting + expert
scrambled 276 weighting + expert
SUM 1452
(2) if two I don’t know cases→weighting scheme + expert check
for final decision
(3) if no I don’t know cases, but results scrambled (001, or 110)
→ weighting scheme + expert check
There were only four possible situations of ambiguity. Firstly, if
one of the annotators selected I don’t know (later IDK or uncertain),
or there was no annotation, the remaining two annotators were
taken into consideration. Here, if both selected the same answer,
we considered the case as solved (however, we still checked those
samples in the second stage of annotations for final confirmation).
If the results were scrambled, we applied appropriate weighting
scheme to propose an initial proposed estimated value (either 1
for harmful or 0 for non-harmful), and asked an additional cyber-
bullying expert to verify the choice. Weighting was based on each
annotator’s average agreement score (the higher the better). Also,
when none of the annotators selected IDK but the results were still
scrambled, we also applied an appropriate weighting scheme with
expert’s verification. Finally, when there were two IDK answers, we
considered the remaining non ambiguous answer as a potentially
correct, but with a strong voice from the second stage of annota-
tions and the additional expert. Table 6 contains the outline of the
distribution of samples.
Apart fromweighting the annotators, we assigned a custom score
of annotation confidence to all annotations. The confidence score
could be either high, medium, or low, and was assigned according
to the following principles.
Firstly, all non-ambiguous annotations (all three agreements)
were considered to have a high confidence. The annotations for
which one of the answers was IDK, but the other two were unequiv-
ocal, were also considered as high. Samples which had scrambled
annotations were assigned high confidence if two top-weight anno-
tators agreed, medium if first and last agreed, and low if only two
low-weight annotators agreed.
All other annotations were assigned low confidence. This ac-
counts for the following situations. The samples with two IDK
annotations represent a situation, where two of the annotators
were not sure what class to assign to the sample. Therefore, even if
the third annotator proposed a not-IDK annotation, it cannot be
considered as sufficiently certain, and should be checked by an ad-
ditional expert. Also, if one annotator did not know what to assign,
and the other two disagreed, this too represents a situation, where
a clear answer cannot be drawn only from the three annotators and
should be checked by additional expert.
Table 7: Agreements between annotators in the second stage
of annotation.
ID Mean agreement Standard deviation
#03 76% 17%
#04 71% 17%
#01 68% 16%
#02 61% 2%
#08 61% 2%
#07 59% 6%
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Figure 2: Agreements between annotators in the second
stage of annotation.
It also has to be added that whether an annotator was considered
as high-weight or low-weight annotator was not specified top-down
only on the basis of the annotator’s average agreement score, but
rather calculated separately for each sample. Since each sample was
annotated by different set of annotators, the three annotators for
each sample were considered to have high, medium or low weight
depending on how their average agreement related to other two
annotators for the sample.
2.5.3 II Stage of Annotations and Final Disambiguation of Sam-
ples. In the second stage of annotations we applied only six an-
notators who decided to perform the additional annotations. The
samples were assigned to the annotators randomly, with a strict
rule that the annotators did not see or annotate the samples in
the first step of annotations. Even if the annotator obtained a high
agreement previously, their annotation performance could deteri-
orate over time. Therefore, the mean agreements for the second
stage were also calculated and considered separately from the first
stage. Overall average agreements were in general much lower for
the second stage of annotations. This confirms that the cases that
were annotated were in general more problematic to annotate, and
the disambiguation did not result from annotators’ personal perfor-
mance. Table 7 and Figure 2 contain the overall average agreements
of the annotators that took part in the second stage of annotations.
The results of the second annotation are given in Table 8. It
solved over half of the problem of ambiguity. For this part we
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Table 8: The outline of the dataset after the second stage of
annotation.
Type of Ambiguity Number Percentage
All Ambiguous 1452
2nd annotation = unequivocal 753 52% (of all amb.)
↪→ confirmed = SOLVED 652 87% (of unequiv.)
↪→ unconfirmed = NEED CHECK 101 13% (of unequiv.)
2nd annotation = equivocal 699 48% (of all amb.)
Table 9: Final results of the annotation after two stages of
annotation and expert’s decision for the hardest cases.
Type Number Percentage
harmful 913 7%
non-harmful 11859 93%
total 12772
compared the score with the first annotations. If the score was
the same, we considered it as the final score. This accounted for
87% of unequivocal cases (in the second stage), which in most part
confirmed most of the first stage annotations, thus reassuring us
about the quality of annotations. Next, if the score was different
(13% of cases), the expert performed confirmation check to make
the final decision on which result was correct. Out of the remaining
half (48%) of the equivocally annotated cases, we performed the
initial automatic disambiguation based on average agreement of
each annotator, compared the results to the first stage annotations
and had the cyberbullying expert double check all the remaining
cases to make the final decision.
The final annotated data after all disambiguation and final check
by the expert contained 913 cyberbullying cases (7%) within the
overall 12772 cases. The results are summarized in Table 9.
Our final annotations contained more cyberbullying cases than
the original annotations performed by previous researchers. We
were also able to both correct the cases wrongly annotated as harm-
ful, and those incorrectly annotated as non-harmful (mentioned
in Section 2.1). Since the quality of annotations was increased, we
also assumed that this would improve the objectivity of the evalua-
tion of the proposed system, as well as help develop more accurate
machine learning model in the final hybrid system.
2.6 Dataset Properties
Table 10 reports some key statistics of the dataset. Statistics de-
scribed as harmful and non-harmful refer to the final version of
the new annotations. The dataset contains approximately 300 thou-
sand of tokens, making it rather small regarding current ML trends.
There are no big differences in length between the posted questions
and answers (approx. 12 words). On the other hand, the harmful
samples are usually a bit shorter than the non-harmful samples
(approx. 23 vs. 25 words). The number of harmful examples is small,
amounting to only 7%, yet it seems to be rather high compared to
the average content of social networks.
Table 10: Statistics of the dataset computed after final anno-
tation of the data.
Element type Value
Number of samples 12772
Number of harmful samples 913
Number of non-harmful samples 11859
Number of all tokens 301198
Number of unique tokens 18394
Avg. length (characters) of a single post (Q + A) 120.1
Avg. length (words) of a single post (Q + A) 23.6
Avg. length (characters) of a single question 61.6
Avg. length (words) of a single question 12.0
Avg. length (characters) of a single answer 58.5
Avg. length (words) of a single answer 11.5
Avg. length (characters) of a harmful post 120.1
Avg. length (words) of a harmful post 22.9
Avg. length (characters) of a non-harmful post 130.9
Avg. length (words) of a non-harmful post 24.7
2.7 Comparison with the Previous Annotation
The original annotation provides 802 samples out of 12772 (6.3%)
labeled as cyberbullying (or harmful), according to the proposed
method of classifying a post as cyberbullying if it was labeled as cy-
berbullying by at least 2 out of 3 annotators [1]. The new annotation
provides 913 samples out of 12772 (7.1%) labeled as harmful.
There are 392 samples that were labeled as non-harmful in the
original annotation and as harmful in the new annotation. 9 out
of 10 examples from Section 2.1 were correctly labeled as harmful
in the new annotation. Some additional examples are given in
Appendix B.
There are 281 samples that were labeled as harmful in the original
annotation and as non-harmful in the new annotation. 10 out of 10
examples from section 2.1 were correctly labeled as non-harmful
in the new annotation. Some additional examples are given in
Appendix B.
3 SAMURAI - CYBERBULLYING DETECTION
SYSTEM
In this section we present Samurai – the cyberbullying detection
system, its simplified architectural workflow, its key features com-
pared to the other state-of-the-art approaches to the cyberbullying
detection, the onboarding process, and the way the system was
provided for testing.
3.1 System Overview
Samurai is a hybrid AI prototype system for detecting cyberbully-
ing. It utilizes statistical components (e.g. deep learning modules)
under the strict government of symbolic modules. A statistical com-
ponent can be used to perform certain well-defined sub-tasks (e.g.
phrase classification), but there is always a symbolic module that
is responsible for making the final decision whether or not a text
contains cyberbullying. This approach enables the decision-making
process to be largely explainable and trackable.
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A few examples of combining statistical components with sym-
bolic governance within the system:
(1) A statistical component is used to determine if a given ex-
pression can be considered as abusive, whereas a symbolic
module is responsible for determining if the expression is
targeted against an interlocutor (e.g. by the use of a linking
verb).
(2) A symbolic module is used to detect all conditional construc-
tions as potential candidates, and to split them into condition
and consequence parts. Then, a statistical component is used
to evaluate harmfulness of the consequence part, whereas
another symbolic part is responsible for verifying – based
on the statistical evaluation – if the whole candidate can be
considered as a blackmail or not.
(3) The highest-level counterfactual verification of the detected
cases that is able to determine that the sentence “You are an
idiot.” is a personal attack, whereas “I don’t think you are an
idiot.” is not.
The symbolic modules strongly rely on the grammar structure
of a processed text. The grammar structure is given through a
deep syntactic analysis provided by a dedicated syntactic parser –
Language Decoder (a proprietary and patented technology of Samu-
rai Labs). The methodology of building precise models based on
grammar structure involves elements of Context-based Information
Extraction (another proprietary and patent-pending technology of
Samurai Labs).
Samurai utilizes a multi-level modular architecture, where the
top-level division is comprised of a text preparation engine and a
detection engine. The detection engine consists of a set of dedicated
modules, where each module is responsible for detecting a specific
online violence phenomenon. Each module is comprised of a set
of sub-modules specialized in finding certain aspects of the given
phenomenon. For example, a sub-module detecting abusive com-
parisons towards an interlocutor is a part of a module responsible
for personal attacks detection. Under each sub-module there are
groups of dedicated rules that directly set logical constraints on
the grammar structure. As a result, Samurai is able to provide a
multi-level hierarchical categorization of the detected phenomena
and their aspects.
The detection engine is preceded by the text preparation engine
that contains normalization, correction and transformation mod-
ules. Its purpose is to prepare input text for the detection process.
Normalization is the process of adjusting an input text into a prede-
fined standard format (e.g. support for encoding, emoticons, special
characters and segmentation). Correction is the process of revising
the normalized text in order to remove misspellings and any other
errors that may impede the work of the detection engine. It covers
correction-related tasks from handling abbreviations and typos to
solving the complex problems with grammatical errors based on
the context. The correction module is also responsible for detect-
ing attempts to cheat the system such as using various spelling
combinations (e.g. switching letters with numbers or similarly look-
ing unicode characters). Transformation performs operations on
normalized and corrected text that makes it more suitable for the
detection engine, including support for idiomatic expressions, some
aspects of coreference resolution and filling a sentence with omitted
words or phrases (e.g. pronouns or infinitive particles).
3.2 Onboarding Process
The onboarding is a process that adjusts the system to the client’s
needs. It starts with the client defining what would be the desired
system’s reaction to certain phenomena. The process of gathering
this information can be performed in any form of question and
answer interviews (or surveys), including a simple online survey
on the product’s website. The concept is that for every question
the client decides “yes / no” whether the system should “block” or
“pass” a given phenomenon. Exemplary questions from the standard
onboarding process are given in Appendix B.
Question can appear in several different levels of intensity –
from almost non-offensive to highly offensive. If the answer for
the current question is “pass,” then a more offensive version is
presented. For example, a client wants the non-abusive questions
about sexuality to pass through. The next version of the question
would be: what is the desired reaction for coarse questions about
sexuality. This hierarchical process allows the system to set the
proper boundaries to determine what should be blocked and what
should pass through.
Once the questions are answered, a trained engineer adjusts
the system based on the desired guidelines. Due to the multi-level
modular architecture, this process resembles switching on and off
certain nodes on a decision tree. For example, if a client wants the
non-abusive questions about sexuality to pass through, an engineer
goes to the sexual harassment module in the detection engine,
then to the submodule responsible for detecting questions about
sexuality, and finally to the section related to non-abusive topics of
the questions. Only the latter one becomes disabled, which fulfills
the client’s need without interrupting any other parts of the system.
At the end, the customized version of the API is released and the
client is provided with the proper access.
For the purpose of this research, a person without significant
engineering skills and linguistic knowledge was asked to role-play
the client for the onboarding process. The “client” was provided
with the final version of the re-annotated dataset. The questions
were asked in batches so that the “client” had enough time to find
the answers in the dataset. One trained engineer was involved in
the process of adjusting the system on the Samurai Labs’ side. The
whole onboarding process lasted 3 workdays. The final annotations
were delivered on June 12, 2018, the process started on June 13, 2018
and ended up on June 17, 2018. Aside from this standard onboarding
process, the newly labeled dataset was never used in the process of
building or refining the Samurai system.
3.3 System API
For the purpose of preparing this report, the standard Samurai
Labs’ procedures were applied. The Samurai was provided in a
form of dedicated API after the onboarding process described in
the previous section. The system is cloud-hosted. The API takes in
a single text as a POST request.
An exemplary API request as a cURL command:
curl -H "x-api-key: <API KEY>"
--data-urlencode "text=<TEXT TO PROCESS>" <API URL>
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After the onboarding process, the client is provided with the API
KEY and the API URL, which have to be provided as parameters to
the POST call.
The API responds with JSON containing a score representing an
online violence level in a scale of 0 to 1, and a list of detected online
violence categories (e.g. direct abuse towards interlocutor). The
online violence level is represented with a score from 0 (no violence)
to 1 (high level of violence), with a threshold at 0.7 (medium level
of violence). The API is set up to process 20 texts per second.
Few example API responses are given in Appendix B.
4 EXPERIMENT
In this section we present procedures and results of testing the
Samurai system along with one well-known classification algorithm
(Fasttext) and five commercial products for cyberbullying detection
and content moderation, that are currently available on the market.
Additionally, for the Samurai system, an error analysis is provided to
further evaluate the system’s performance and the new annotation’s
quality.
4.1 Procedure
To assess the Samurai system and to check if there are important dif-
ferences between the annotations the following experiments were
conducted. The researchers from AGH University of Science and
Technology were given access to the API. In the first experiment the
original Formspring dataset with its annotation was used. An entry
was counted as harmful, if at least two of the three annotators
marked it as such. Therefore, an entry was counted as not harm-
ful if the majority of the annotators agreed that it is not harmful.
For the system, an entry was considered harmful, if it received
score 0.7 or above. Thus true positive was counted when both the
annotation and the system marked given sample as harmful, false
positive when the system considered it harmful, while the annota-
tion not and false negative when the system considered a sample as
not harmful, while the annotation as harmful.
In the second experiment the new annotation was used. The
harmful samples were established by the procedure described in
Section 2. Besides that the true positives, false positives and false
negatives were defined the same as in the first experiment. After a
first round of queries, it turned out, that some of the results were
different between what was reported by the creators of the system
and the results obtained by AGH researchers. Since the researchers
didn’t have access to the system, they inspected the samples that
were causing the differences. It turned out that the they had one
thing in common: presence of HTML entities. The samples were
processed to convert these HTML entities into regular characters.
After the conversion, there was no difference between the results
reported by the creators of the system and the AGH researchers.
Regarding the performance of the system – there were 2 timeouts.
Repeating the calls for the same samples caused another timeouts,
thus it seems that the error is connected with these examples. The
problem was reported to the Samurai team.
To compare the performance of the system with an off-the-shell
classification algorithm, Fasttext [5] was selected as one of algo-
rithms that performs particularly good in many NLP-related tasks.
The system was run with the following parameters:
Table 11: The results for cyberbullying detection for the
tested systems computed using the old annotation and the
new annotation.
Algorithm Accuracy Precision Recall F1 score
Old annotation
Fasttext 0.934 0.457 0.432 0.444
Samurai 0.950 0.570 0.704 0.630
System A 0.738 0.113 0.481 0.182
System B 0.815 0.132 0.367 0.194
System C 0.679 0.093 0.490 0.156
System D 0.483 0.070 0.611 0.125
System E 0.886 0.160 0.204 0.179
New annotation
Fasttext 0.923 0.466 0.507 0.486
Samurai 0.974 0.804 0.843 0.823
System A 0.788 0.230 0.835 0.360
System B 0.853 0.277 0.656 0.390
System C 0.723 0.179 0.798 0.292
System D 0.515 0.111 0.821 0.195
System E 0.895 0.283 0.307 0.294
supervised -dim 10 -lr 0.1 -wordNgrams 2 -minCount 1
-bucket 10000000 -epoch 5 -thread 4
The testing procedure for Fasttext followed the 10-fold cross vali-
dation scheme.
Additionally, 5 commercial systems providing cyberbullying de-
tection and content moderation (denoted as A, B, C, D and E) were
tested using the same datasets. In each case (including Fasttext) the
available parameters were tuned to obtain the best possible results
(F1 measure was used as the optimization criterion).
4.2 Results
The results of the experiment are summarized in Table 11, Figure 3
and Figure 4. Accuracy, precision, recall and F1 are defined in the
standard way [6]:
Accuracy = T P+T NT P+T N+FN+F P
Precision = T PT P+F P
Recall = T PT P+FN
F1 = 2∗Pr∗RcPr+Rc
In Table 12 we also give raw values for true positives, false positives,
true negatives and false negatives, in order to emphasize the actual
number of detected cases and false alarms, and to stress the fact,
that some of the examples caused API errors, which are not taken
into account when computing the above defined measures.
The Samurai system gives the best results in all of the measures
on the new as well as the old annotation. Most importantly, it gives
the best F1 score on the new annotation, which is significantly better
than Fasttext (more than 80% compared to 44%-49% depending on
the annotation). This difference is mainly due to high recall of the
system, reaching nearly 85%, which is particularly important for
the purpose of preventing the harmful aspects of cyberbullying.
All the other commercial systems perform worse than the Fasttext
algorithm. Their low performance is due to their low precision
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Table 12: Raw results for cyberbullying detection for the
tested systems computed using the the new annotation. Dif-
ferences in totals are due to errors in API calls. TP – true
positive, FP – false positive, FN – false negative, TN – true
negative.
Algorithm TP FP TN FN Total
Fasttext 463 530 11329 450 12772
Samurai 770 188 11669 143 12770
System A 762 2553 9284 151 12750
System B 599 1562 10297 314 12772
System C 729 3355 8503 184 12771
System D 750 6028 5831 163 12772
System E 280 710 11149 633 12772
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Figure 3: Performance of the tested systems with respect to
the old annotation.
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Figure 4: Performance of the tested systems with respect to
the new annotation.
spanning from 7% (systemD on the old annotation) to 28.3% (system
E on the new annotation).
The results also show that the new annotation is more coherent
than the original one since the machine learning algorithmwas able
to give better precision and better recall on that dataset. Samurai
and the other systems which were not trained on the dataset also
gave better results. The differences are pretty large, especially in
terms of precision, meaning that the new annotation is a much
different dataset, than the old one.
4.3 Error analysis
Since no part of the Samurai system was trained or built using the
newly labeled dataset (the system was adjusted using the dataset
in the onboarding process), it would be very informative to analyze
the errors that the system made in relation to the new annotations.
The error analysis was performed by a Samurai Labs’ team mem-
ber involved in the process of building the Samurai system. For the
sake of transparency, the whole analysis is publicly available in a
read-only Google Sheets under https://goo.gl/frRiZP.
The document is divided into two sections regarding false posi-
tives and false negatives, separately. Each error was classified into
one of three following categories (each represented by a separate
column): “CORRECT”: The annotators’ decision is considered to
be appropriate; the system is wrong; “MAYBE”: The case is “on the
edge” and the given criteria were not sufficient enough; the decision
if it should be blocked or passed through would require new criteria
that take into consideration these phenomena; “INCORRECT”: The
annotators’ decision is considered to be inappropriate (e.g. due to
the arbitrary omission or clear incompatibility with the annotation
instruction / guidelines); it should not be considered as an error
since the system is right.
For the 188 false positives:
• 44 (23.4%) were considered as CORRECT,
• 79 (42%) as INCORRECT, and
• 65 (34.6%) were labeled as MAYBE.
Among false positives, the largest part comprises INCORRECT
cases which draws a conclusion that even the high standards of
the annotation process allow some occurrences of cyberbullying to
glide over.
A significant part of INCORRECT cases (16 out of 79) comprises
posts containing phenomena that were labeled as “harmful” in other
posts. As there is no significant discriminant between those two
groups, they should be labeled in the same manner. Otherwise, the
annotation would be inconsistent. The other part (11 out of 79)
comprises labels incompatible with the annotation instruction /
guidelines (point 2. in Online Violence Target section). The largest
part (30 out of 79) comprises posts containing direct abuses towards
an interlocutor, without a clear impression that the usage is con-
sensual. Among these cases, 12 of 30 are assignments that assign
an abusive phrase to the interlocutor using linking verbs, and 18 of
30 are abusive vocative cases.
The largest part of MAYBE cases (33 out of 65) also comprises
posts containing direct abuses towards an interlocutor, but these
cases seem to be consensual based on the given context. Among
these cases, 10 of 33 are assignments that assign an abusive phrase
to the interlocutor using linking verbs, and 23 of 33 are abusive
vocative cases. A significant part (8 out of 65) comprises posts
containing mild sex-related content. Although they are not abu-
sive towards an interlocutor, the decision whether they should be
“blocked” or “passed through” should be unambiguously defined by
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the proper guidelines. Most of the other cases can also be considered
as abusive towards an interlocutor but with a clear impression that
interlocutors jointly agree for the given form of the conversation.
For the 143 false negatives:
• 68 (47.5%) were considered as CORRECT,
• 25 (17.5%) as INCORRECT, and
• 50 (35%) were labeled as MAYBE.
Among false negatives, the largest part comprises CORRECT
cases which is an expected situation. Although, both MAYBE and
INCORRECT cases cover more than half of all false negatives and
therefore require at least brief elaboration.
A significant part of MAYBE cases (25 out of 50) comprises posts
containing mild sex-related content that is not abusive towards an
interlocutor or any other person. The next significant part (10 of
50) comprises posts contains coarse language (including 4 exam-
ples of sex-related content) that remain not abusive towards an
interlocutor.
The INCORRECT cases comprise posts that do not contain sex-
related content and it is very hard to consider them as cyberbullying
even under a very rigorous criteria. Most of them resemble normal
conversation between two people that jointly agree for the given
form of the conversation. Some of them (5 out of 25) contain coarse
language, but it is clearly not used to offend an interlocutor.
The future work with the dataset should take into consideration
all these cases, especially due to the fact that they can be grouped
into well defined categories. The analysis of false positives shows
that despite the high standards of the annotation process, some
significant number of cyberbullying cases was still able to sneak
through, including some violences of the annotation guidelines.
The analysis of false negatives shows that especially the criteria
telling what to do with mild sex-related content should be defined
unambiguously and with a great attention before the annotation
process. Three methods are proposed to improve the annotation
process:
(1) To prepare more precise annotation instruction / guidelines
with a number of illustrative (positive and negative) exam-
ples, especially “on the edge” examples.
(2) To ensure that annotators work in small batches as tiredness
is one of the key causes for making mistakes such as violence
of the annotation guidelines.
(3) To set some checkpoints during the process when annota-
tors can freely discuss their thoughts and doubts among
themselves and with external experts.
5 CONCLUSIONS
The in-depth analysis of the Formspring dataset performed during
the annotation process showed that the original annotation was
not perfect. Although, in the case of any NLP task it is hard to say
that any annotation is perfect, the results of evaluation of many
cyberbullying detection algorithms as well as the results of training
a machine learning algorithm indicate that the new annotation is
more coherent. We expect that it might become a new reference
annotation for this task.
Samurai demonstrates that its novel approach can comprise an
effective way for cyberbullying detection. In that case, high recall
goes side by side with high precision, which indicates the possi-
bility of using the system for real-time automatic cyberbullying
blocking and content moderation. Furthermore, both the annota-
tion process and the error analysis show how much depends on
the adopted criteria, and therefore how important it is for a cyber-
bullying detection system to be effectively adjustable to the given
criteria.
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